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SOME LIMITS ON THE JUDICIAL POWER
TO RESTRICT DISSEMINATION OF
DISCOVERY
INTRODUCTION
The pretrial process of discovery governed by Federal and Maine
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 enables plaintiffs in product liability ac-
tions to delve where few people have delved before-into a corpora-
tion's internal memoranda, competitive practices, and secret prod-
uct or design information as well as other less sensitive information
in a company's possession. Discovery, in this context as in others, is
a powerful tool determined by the courts to be necessary for the just
litigation of claims.
As a balance to the leeway given parties to compel production of
information in discovery,' federal and Maine courts have the author-
ity under Federal and Maine Rule 26(c) to protect parties and wit-
nesses from the harm that can result from a disclosure of confiden-
tial information.2 The court may enter a protective order, sometimes
1. See, e.g., Colony Cadillac & Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Yerdon, 558 A.2d 364,366 (Me.
1989) (stating that a party refusing to produce information requested in discovery on
the basis that it was improper should have moved for a Rule 26(c) protective order).
2. Federal and Maine Rule 26(c) are substantially the same with the exception of
an admonition in the Maine Rule to exercise the rule "with liberality." Me R Civ P
26(c) reads:
Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from
whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, any justice or judge of
the court in which the action is pending may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, op-
pression, or undue burden or expense, including without limitation one or
more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discov-
ery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designa-
tion of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a
method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discov-
ery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the
discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted
with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a dep-
osition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a
trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial in-
formation not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated war, (8) that
the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed
in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court; (9) that the party
taking the deposition pay the traveling expenses of the opposite party and
of his attorney for attending the taking of the deposition; (10) that a wit-
ness under the control of the party taking the deposition be required to be
brought within the state for his deposition. The power of the court under
this rule shall be exercised with liberality toward the accomplishment of its
purpose to protect parties and witnesses.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the
court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or
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called a confidentiality order, restricting a party receiving the infor-
mation from disseminating it or from making any use of the infor-
mation other than for purposes of the specific litigation.3 In addi-
tion, public access to information after its use in the litigation often
is barred by such orders.
Irrespective of the legal interests of the parties involved in the
case, however, the public outside the legal community may have an
interest in the information, and the receiving party may wish to dis-
close it. This point is brought into focus by the occasional case in
which confidential information raises dramatic health issues, such as
the recent reports of potential health risks from silicone breast
implants."
Judicial use of Rule 26(c) to restrict dissemination of discovered
information predictably has invited First Amendment claims of free
speech.5 In 1984 the Supreme Court held in the landmark case of
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhineharts that courts could restrict parties' or
witnesses' dissemination of discovered information for good cause
without infringing on First Amendment rights. Despite the Seattle
Times decision, however, courts have continued to struggle with the
extent to which protective orders implicate the First Amendment.7
-Indeed, the disparity among courts regarding the appropriate use
of protective orders goes beyond variations in addressing the First
Amendment issue. The differences include variations not only in the
specific showing required to justify a protective order, but also in
the materials covered by orders and in the scope of restrictions im-
posed on the litigants.
This disparity in courts' approaches to protective orders has per-
sisted despite the frequent use of protective orders in product liabil-
ity and commercial litigation." While any explanation for this persis-
person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply
to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
3. Id.
4. See Philip J. Hilts, F.D.A. Seeks Halt in Breast Implants Made of Silicone,
NY. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1992, at Al, C5 (reporting that memoranda entered as sealed
evidence in cases indicated that Dow Corning Co. may have known that its breast
implants may leak or rupture).
5. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals observed: "There is the potential for an
infringement of the first amendment whenever the government prohibits or restrains
free speech or publication." Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1986).
6. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
7. See infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 129 F.R.D. 483, 485
n.4 (D.N.J. 1990) (noting a trend toward seeking protective orders in that court);
Ericson v. Ford Motor Co., 107 F.R.D. 92, 94 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (reporting that federal
district courts are "being bombarded by an ever increasing number of requests for
protective orders"). See also Anne Cohen, Access to Pretrial Documents Under the
First Amendment, 84 COLUM. L REV, 1813, 1844 (1984) (noting the "tendency of
courts to grant inartful protective orders with little 'cause' shown").
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tence may be speculative, it likely results from a combination of
factors. Protective orders are interlocutory orders arising out of the
discovery process,' are issued by trial courts given broad discre-
tion,10 are reviewable only for abuse of that discretion or for clear
error of law,1' and sometimes are not vigorously opposed by plain-
tiff's counsel because of the more readily apparent interest in mov-
ing forward with discovery. 2
Maine courts are empowered and exhorted by Maine Rule 26(c) to
issue protective orders. Unlike the Federal Rule, Maine Rule 26(c)
includes an admonition for the courts to exercise their powers to
grant a protective order and other controls over discovery "with lib-
erality. . . to protect parties and witnesses.""3 Whether conscious of
the admonition or not, state courts in product liability cases have
issued broadly constructed protective orders restricting plaintiffs,
their attorneys and their witnesses from revealing information."
The risk for all trial courts, confronted with the potential magni-
tude of discovery problems'" and hesitant to spend their limited
time on this one procedural issue,'6 is that the power to grant pro-
tective orders will degenerate into a perfunctory granting of most or
even all such requests. The decision to grant such an order becomes
perfunctory when the court does so without an appropriate "good
cause" determination and without a careful fashioning of the order
to minimize its impact on the affected parties. In Maine's courts,
despite the admonition to use the protective-order power liberally,
the same considerations apply as fully as in federal courts to a de-
termination of whether a protective order is justified.
This Comment examines these considerations and concludes that
trial courts must guard against exercising too freely their power to
9. FRANCIS H HARE. JR.. JAMES L GILBERT. AND WILLIAM H REMINE. CONFIDFNM1
ALITY ORDERS § 2.2, at 10 [hereinafter HARE].
10. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36.
11. Protective orders are appealable under a collateral order exception to the final
judgment rule. See In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1307-08 (7th Cir.
1984). Some courts also may issue a writ of mandamus when the trial court has com-
mitted a clear error of law and the party has no alternative means of obtaining relief.
HARE, supra note 9, § 6.15, at 159.
12. "All too often, the plaintiffs attorney is unaware of the strategic significance
of the motion [for a protective order]." HARE, supra note 9, § 1.1, at 2.
13. ME. R. Civ P. 26(c).
14. See, e.g., Bailey & Bailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Emerson Elec. Co., No.
CV-88-187 (Me. Super. Ct., Sag. Cty., Apr. 17, 1990). "All documents produced or
information disclosed and designated or marked as 'confidential' by the Defendant
shall be revealed, except as provided below, only to counsel to this case. Such infor-
mation shall include confidential, proprietary and/or trade secret information sup-
plied by the Defendant in response to the Plaintiffs' demands or requests." ld at 1.
15. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36 n.23.
16. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to
the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 428, 456 (1991).
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issue protective orders. Such an overly broad exercise of the power
relieves movants of their burden to articulate with some specificity
the potential harm constituting good cause for restricting parties'
and witnesses' First Amendment interests. An understanding of the
implications of protective orders should encourage courts to fashion
such orders in a way that minimizes the effect on the parties and
witnesses without sacrificing the protective purpose of the order.
Part I of this Comment provides a background on protective orders.
Part II revisits Seattle Times and explores how courts have inter-
preted it to recognize a limited First Amendment consideration.
Part III discusses the standard of good cause to issue a protective
order. Part IV explores the court's responsibilities in fashioning a
protective order, taking into consideration the disadvantages the
court's choices present to the plaintiff and the defendant. Part V
examines public access to information gathered in discovery, both at
the pretrial stage and after the information has been used in a judi-
cial proceeding or as a basis for a judgment. Finally, Part VI as-
sesses the effects of protective orders on litigants and witnesses after
trial, a timely subject given the current appeal of a protective order
from the United States District Court for the District of Maine to
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 17
I. BACKGROUND
With the growth of compelled discovery in civil cases during this
century,"' protective orders have become a frequently used tool to
limit the dissemination of discovered material.19 Protective orders
ostensibly protect parties and witnesses from injury by the publica-
tion of their trade secrets or of otherwise confidential information. 0
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and its counterpart in the
Maine Rules of Civil Procedure authorize the court in which an ac-
tion is pending to issue an order protecting a party or person from
17. Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., No. 90-0245 P (D. Me. Jan. 17, 1992).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) and ME. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) are identical and provide
for an extremely wide scope of discovery. Both rules read, in part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim
or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible
things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
See generally 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2007 (1970) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
19. See supra note 8.
20. Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 COR-
NELL L. REV 1, 9 (1983).
[Vol. 44:417
DISSEMINATION OF DISCO VERY
"annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense. . . ."" The order must be made "[u]pon motion by a party
or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause
shown . "..."22
The federal Rule derives from Rule 30(b),2" which was adopted in
1938. The original provisions of Rule 30(b) allowed for protective
orders only with regard to depositions. 2' However, Rules 33 and 34
were amended in 1948 to provide for the use of Rule 30(b) orders for
written interrogatories and requests for admission.2" A reorganiza-
tion of the discovery rules in 1970 resulted in the current Rule 26(c),
with an added provision for protecting trade secrets and confidential
commercial information to reflect the prevailing practices in the
courts.26
The federal Rule was adopted to protect parties and witnesses in
light of "the almost unlimited right of discovery" provided by Rule
26(b).-" To that end, the court is given far-ranging discretion to
fashion orders protecting against abuse or misuse of the discovery
process.
The background and purposes of Maine Rule 26(c) are parallel to
those of the federal Rule. Maine Rule 26(c) originated in Maine
Rule 30(b). 8 The rule providing for protective orders was viewed by
influential commentators on Maine law as "the chief bulwark of the
rules against abuse of the deposition machinery. The court is
charged with a heavy responsibility in making such order as justice
requires . . . . If the court fails to be vigilant, the potential abuses
may outweigh the benefits of the discovery procedure."2'
21. FED. R. Civ. P 26(c); M. R Civ P 26(c).
22. Id.
23. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2035, at 260.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 260-61.
26. Id.; FED. R Civ. P. 26(c), Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Subdivision
(c)-Protective Orders. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.. 529 F.
Supp. 866, 890 n.41 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
27. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2036. at 267.
28. CHARLES A. HARVEY. JR&. RAYMOND G McGIRE. & L KMNVIN WROTH, MAINE
CIVIL PRACTICE 207 (Supp. 1981) [hereinafter MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE. SuPP 1.
29. 1 RICHARD H. FIELD. VINCENT L. McKuscK. & L KINVIN WROTH, MAINE CIVIL
PRACTICE § 30.2, at 490 (1970) [hereinafter MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE].
Indeed, Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d) requires that the court not excuse
failure to attend a deposition, serve answers to interrogatories, or respond to a re-
quest for inspection on the basis of the discovery's being objectionable unless a pro-
tective order has been sought. "The failure to act described in this subdivision may
not be excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the
party failing to act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c)." ME
R. Civ. P. 37(d). See Colony Cadillac & Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Yerdon, 558 A.2d 364. 366-
67 (Me. 1989) (because no protective order was sought, court was within its discretion
to default defendant for failure to comply with discovery orders); Ireland v. Galen.
401 A.2d 1002, 1005 (Me. 1979) (because no protective order was sought before failure
1992]
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The Maine Supreme Judicial Court's concern for potential abuse
of discovery was evident in a statement in Maine Rule 30(b) di-
recting the courts to make liberal use of protective orders "toward
the accomplishment of [the Rule's] purpose to protect parties and
witnesses. '3 0 The Advisory Committee noted somewhat redundantly
in its tentative draft that the purpose of the admonition was "to
emphasize that the rule should be administered . . . to afford ade-
quate protection to parties and witnesses, particularly in cases in-
volving small sums. '"" The statement on liberality was retained in
the reorganization of the provisions into Maine Rule 26(c). 2 Other
commentators have explained that the language "re-emphasises the
intended breadth of application. '33
Rule 26(c) in both the federal and Maine rules requires a showing
of "good cause" before the court issues a protective order. The rule
puts the burden of persuasion on the party who seeks the order.3 4
The movant must show good cause through "a particular and spe-
cific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and
conclusory statements. '3 5
The good cause standard suggests three issues for analysis: the na-
ture of the interest to be protected, the sufficiency of the harm that
to comply with discovery order, defense that discovery request was not served on a
party could not be asserted).
30. 1 MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE, supra note 29, at 481.
31. ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE RULES OF COURT PROCEDURE. TENTATIVE DRAFT,
MAINE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 111-12 (Aug. 1, 1958).
32. MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE. SUPP., supra note 28, at 207.
33. Id. at 239.
34. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2035, at 264-65; Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986); General Dynamics Corp. v. Seib Mfg.
Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974).
35. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2035, at 264-65; Anderson v. Cryovac,
Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986).
"Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated
reasoning, do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785
F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986).
A business may have a greater difficulty showing the need for a protective order
when the issue is embarrassment than when the issue is a trade secret, other proprie-
tary information, or competitive harm.
[Blecause release of information not intended by the writer to be for public
consumption will almost always have some tendency to embarrass, an appli-
cant for a protective order whose chief concern is embarrassment must
demonstrate that the embarrassment will be particularly serious. As embar-
rassment is usually thought of as a nonmonetizable harm to individuals, it
may be especially difficult for a business enterprise, whose primary measure
of well-being is presumably monetizable, to argue for a protective order on
this ground.
Id. A showing of harm to competitive and financial position may be required. See Joy
v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982) (distinguishing the harm from disseminat-
ing information about past mismanagement from that which results from disseminat-
ing information which is proprietary).
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is threatened by dissemination, and any countervailing interests
militating against the issuance of the order or the dimensions of the
order.3 6 Countervailing interests may include the effectiveness of the
order in preventing the harm, alternative and less restrictive means
to prevent the harm, the interests of the party opposing the motion
(and those of other litigants in related cases), the administration of
justice itself, and interests of third parties.37
Federal and Maine Rule 26a(c) are explicit on the uses of the pro-
tective order "to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . ." Rule
26(c)(7), in both federal and Maine form, specifically empowers the
court to fashion the order to protect "trade secret or other confiden-
tial research, development, or commercial information . . .,38
Requests for protective orders in the context of discovery com-
monly occur in product liability cases.3 9 The defendant business typ-
ically asserts that the material sought by discovery involves a trade
secret or other proprietary information and asks the court to restrict
the plaintiff from disclosing the material to anyone outside the
case.4 0 In other instances, the defendant seeks a protective order as
protection from embarrassment or damage to reputation." Protec-
tive orders are also used in commercial litigation, and are sometimes
requested by groups or individuals in a variety of actions as a means
to protect personal privacy interests. Indeed, Seattle Times involved
a request by a religious group that sought to keep its membership
lists from being made public.4
2
Protective orders typically are requested early in the litigation
process at a time when the court, in the interest of efficiency, may
not want to weigh each item of discovery on the merits of the mo-
vant's claim of a trade secret, confidentiality, or embarrassment."'
The examination of documents and the hearing process consume ju-
dicial time, slow the pace of discovery, and may further delay resolu-
tion of the case.'" The plaintiff's attorney has interests similar to the
court's in wanting to conserve time, smooth the 'discovery process,
36. HARE, supra note 9, § 1.1.
37. Id. § 6.1, at 115.
38. Maine and Federal Rule 26(c) are substantially the same with the exception of
the Maine Rule's admonition to use the rule with liberality.
39. HARE, supra note 9, § 1.1.
40. Id. The protective order does not restrict the party from disseminating the
identical information if it is gained through some means unconnected with the court's
processes. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 34.
41. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 19,o;
Ericson v. Ford Motor Co., 107 F.R.D. 92, 94 (E.D. Ark. 1985).
42. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 24.
43. Nonetheless, an orderly and smooth discovery process is fostered by attention
to the issue of protective orders before substantial discovery begins. MANVAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION. SECOND, § 21.43 (1985).
44. See Marcus, supra note 20, at 24 n.98 (1983).
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and with deliberate speed reach a settlement or go to trial. However,
the plaintiff's attorney at this early point also may be unaware of
the strategic significance of a protective order."5
Trial courts are given wide discretion to weigh the appropriate-
ness and draw the contours of protective orders.48 The individual
circumstances of each case preclude any exact prescription or de-
tailed instruction on the propriety and scope of such orders.47 The
orders are interlocutory and are subject to review only for clear error
or for abuse of discretion . 4
Courts analyze three issues when fashioning the protective order.
The court must decide (1) to whom the order applies, (2) what infor-
mation the order covers and what kinds of communications are pro-
hibited, and (3) to whom disclosures shall not be made .4 As to the
first issue, courts usually are inclusive and restrict parties, expert
and lay witnesses, consultants, and plaintiff's attorneys and staff
from disclosure.50 Regarding the second issue-what information the
order covers and the kinds of communications to be prohibited-the
restriction may apply to distributing the physical documents them-
selves (or summaries of documents or lists of documents), to forbid-
ding any discussion of documents, or simply to informing counsel in
similar litigation that documents or information undiscovered by
that counsel exist.5 In considering the third issue-people to whom
disclosures shall not be made-restrictions range from the defend-
ant's competitors (the least restrictive); to competitors and the me-
45. HARE, supra note 9, § 2.4, at 14.
46. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36.
47. Both the Federal and Maine Rule 26(c) authorize the court to "make any or-
der which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrass-
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . FED. R. Civ. P 26(c); ME. R
Civ. P. 26(c).
It is impossible to set out in a rule all of the circumstances that may require
limitations on discovery or the kinds of limitations that may be needed.
The rules, instead, permit the broadest scope of discovery and leave it to
the enlightened discretion of the district court to decide what restrictions
may be necessary in a particular case.
8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2036, at 268.
"Only in the context of particular discovery material and a particular trial setting
can a court determine whether the threat to substantial public interests is sufficiently
direct and certain." In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
"[Hiard and fast rules in this area are inappropriate. Frequently the injury that
would flow from disclosure is patent, either from consideration of the documents
alone or against the court's understanding of the background facts. The court's com-
mon sense is a helpful guide." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529
F. Supp. 866, 891 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
48. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1120 (3d Cir. 1986); In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, Etc., 669 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1982).





dia; to competitors, the media, and other plaintiffs' lawyers involved
in similar litigation (the most restrictive).52
A perception has grown among plaintiffs' attorneys and some sec-
tors of the public that protective orders have been overused at the
expense of plaintiffs and the public interest. The perception has
prompted a movement to limit the use of such orders, either by leg-
islation or by a change in rules. Currently, two states have passed
laws and one state has amended its rules of procedure to place more
restrictions on the use of protective orders.5"
For very practical reasons,' many litigants stipulate to protective
orders to facilitate the discovery process. In the absence of a rule or
law to restrict the use of protective orders by stipulation, there often
is no advocate to oppose the issuance of a protective order unless an
intervenor enters. 55
Although protective orders prohibiting dissemination of discov-
ered information prevent abuse of the litigants' power of almost un-
limited discovery, courts are restricted in their use of such orders by
the requirement that they find good cause. When a court finds good
cause, the court has latitude to fashion the application and the
scope of the order to achieve its purpose. Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart arose as a contest of this exercise of the Rule 26(c) power
against a newspaper defendant's First Amendment right to publish.
II. SEATTLE TIMES Co. v. RHINEHART AND THE FnST AMENDMENT
Implicit in Maine and Federal Rule 26(c) is that the party receiv-
ing discovery information may disseminate it at will in the absence
of a protective order." Otherwise, the court would not need to issue
52. Id. In reality, the most restrictive order would be to restrict counsel from dis-
closing information to her own client. Such a restriction was held to be invalid in In
re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108 (lst Cir. 1981), on First Amendment grounds
without any countervailing interest. However, the decision preceded Seattle Times,
and a countervailing interest might be found in a case in which the client was a com-
petitor of the party producing the information in discovery.
53. See infra notes 214-21 and accompanying text.
54. Practical reasons include the time, expense, and the court's good will at stake
in challenging cause for a protective order. The plaintiff typically is focused on facili-
tating discovery toward resolving the litigated issue, not on asserting a right to dis-
seminate information gained through discovery. HAsE, supra note 9. § 1.I. at 2.
Particularly in complex cases, "[t]he parties agree to such orders in order to com-
mence discovery without the expense and delay involved in debating the scope of
protective provisions." Marcus, supra note 20, at 9.
55. "The parties are often overzealous in designating materials confidential."
Marcus, supra note 20, at 11.
56. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 35 (implying that discovery gives
litigants the opportunity to obtain information and release it publicly at the risk of
damage to reputation or privacy of other litigants); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group.
Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 780 (1st Cir. 1988) (interpreting Seattle Times as recognizing
"general first amendment freedoms with regard to information gained through dis-
covery and that, absent a valid court order to the contrary. [litigants] are entitled to
1992]
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a protective order to restrict dissemination. However, prohibiting
the dissemination of information obtained through discovery impli-
cates the First Amendment right of parties and witnesses57 because
protective orders inherently resemble prior restraints on speech a
Prior restraint describes a restriction on speech intended to pre-
vent the speech from reaching an audience, as distinguished from
punishment subsequent to the speech. The distinction between prior
restraint and subsequent punishment is sometimes blurred. A stat-
ute that discourages the publication of speech by the threat of sub-
sequent punishment is not a prior restraint. However, a Minnesota
statute prohibiting defamatory speech was interpreted by the Su-
preme Court in Near v. Minnesota8 9 to be a prior restraint because
"[the object of the statute is not punishment, in the ordinary sense,
but suppression of the offending newspaper or periodical. ' '8 0 The na-
ture of prior restraint is that it involves a pervasive government in-
trusion and can accomplish that intrusion "by a single stroke of the
pen,"'" whereas subsequent punishment typically involves a more
substantial expense of time and resources.6 2 The Supreme Court in
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuarts1 characterized prior restraint as the
''most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights, 6 4 partly because the prior restraint constitutes "an immedi-
ate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of crimi-
nal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint
'freezes' it at least for the time."6 "
At a time when federal courts were in disagreement over the First
Amendment interest implicated in protective orders,6 the United
disseminate the information as they see fit"); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 189 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (recognizing that "the presumption under the discovery rules is that a
party may do anything it wants with discovery material, absent a protective order").
57. "There is the potential for an infringement of the first amendment whenever
the government prohibits or restrains free speech or publication." Anderson v. Cry-
ovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1986).
58. See, e.g., In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 183.
59. 283 U.S. 697, 702-03 (1931).
60. Id. at 711.
61. Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 648, 655-57 (1955).
62. Id. at 656-57. For a short discussion of the identification of prior restraints,
see JEROME A. BARRON AND C. THOMAS DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE
PRESS, §§ 2.1-2.4 (1979).
63. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
64. Id. at 559.
65. Id.
66. Compare International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d Cir.
1963) (holding that First Amendment rights are not implicated in restricting dissemi-
nation of discovery information) with In Re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 188 (finding that
First Amendment rights are not waived as a condition to the privilege to discovery
materials but that First Amendment rights may be limited in narrow circumstances)
and In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 1981) (finding that a "height-
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States Supreme Court decided Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart.67 Se-
attle Times began when the leader (Rhinehart) and some members
of a small religious group called the Aquarian Foundation sued the
Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin in Washington
Superior Court for libel. The suit alleged that the religious group
had suffered a loss of donations from the membership and public as
a result of a series of newspaper articles detailing various incidents
of Rhinehart's behavior, his vacated conviction, and the religious
group's beliefs."
In preparing a defense, the newspapers sought extensive discov-
ery, including financial information, the identity of donors during
the prior ten years, and a list of the members during that time.00
The newspapers clearly stated their intentions to publicize the infor-
mation gained in discovery.70 The plaintiffs opposed the discovery
request and moved for a protective order preventing dissemination
of any information gained through discovery."'
The trial court granted partial discovery but issued a protective
order 2 prohibiting public dissemination of "the financial affairs of
the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian Founda-
tion members, contributors, or clients, and the names and addresses
of those who have been contributors, clients or donors to any of the
various plaintiffs.17 3 The court prohibited the newspaper defendants
from any use of the information except where "necessary . . . to
prepare and try the case.17 4
On appeal by both sides, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed
both the discovery order and the protective order. The Washington
court decided that the plaintiffs had "a recognizable privacy inter-
est; and the giving of publicity to these matters would allegedly and
understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and even
oppression. 71 5
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Washington
ened sensitivity" to First Amendment rights is required in weighing protective
orders).
67. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
68. Id. at 22-23.
69. Id. at 24.
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id.
72. The trial court issued the protective order under Washington Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c) on the religious group's renewal of its motion for an order. The trial
court denied the motion when first made because the assertions by the movants were
"too conclusory to warrant a finding of 'good cause,'" a point that should not be lost
considering some courts' indiscriminate granting of protective orders today. Id. at 25.
27.
73. Id. at 27 (quoting Appendix at 65a, Seattle Times (No. 82-1721)).
74. Id. at 27 n.8.
75. Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 654 P.2d 673, 690 (Wash. 1982) quoted in
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 28.
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court's decision. The Supreme Court held that where "a protective
order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule
26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does
not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from
other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment. 7' The Court
enumerated three principles. First, the right to discovery is by legis-
lative grace and not by First Amendment, so "continued court con-
trol over the discovered information does not raise the same specter
of government censorship that such control might suggest in other
situations."'7 Second, "pretrial depositions and interrogatories are
not public components of a civil trial, '7 8 either historically at com-
mon law or by conduct in modern practice. Consequently, restraints
placed on "not yet admitted" information "are not a restriction on a
traditionally public source of information. 7 Third, the restraint is
not "the kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First
Amendment scrutiny"80 in that only information obtained through
discovery is controlled. Identical information obtained by indepen-
dent means may be disseminated.8 Thus, the First Amendment
rights are implicated "to a far lesser extent" than similar restraints
in a different context, and protective orders occupy a "unique posi-
tion" in relation to the First Amendment.82
Seattle Times seemed to be a departure from a modern history of
placing First Amendment rights above other interests the state be-
lieves to be compelling. The Supreme Court has on other occasions
rejected attempts to infringe on the First Amendment in favor of
the state's interest in preserving the anonymity of juvenile offend-
ers,8 3 in protecting a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a fair trial,84 and in preserving the integrity of public office.88 In-
deed, in New York Times Co. v. United States8" the Court rejected
a prior restraint on documents stolen from the government that in-
volved a national security interest. After Seattle Times, conceivably,
a party could not be restrained from disseminating national secrets
stolen from the government but could be restrained from dissemi-
nating confidential information obtained legally-by court
76. Id. at 37.
77. Id. at 32 (citing In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Wilkey,
J., dissenting)).
78. Id. at 33.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 33-34 (citing Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 399 (1979) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring)).
82. Id. at 34.
83. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
84. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
85. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
86. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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order-from a litigant in the discovery process, without any "com-
pelling interest" or "least restrictive means" requirement. Truly, as
the Seattle Times Court said, Rule 26(c) protective orders occupy a
"unique position . . . in relation to the First Amendment." '87
Several factors existed in Seattle Times that could have en-
couraged the Court in its decision. First, the newspapers' attempted
use of the discovery process as a means of news gathering"8 created
the specter of procedural abuse. The Court noted the trial court's
reasoning that the protective order would "avoid the 'chilling effect'
that dissemination would have on 'a party's willingness to bring his
case to court.' "89 Second, the movants of the protective order had
First Amendment rights to privacy, freedom of religion, and free-
dom of association at stake9 -- interests of considerable potency.
Third, the newspapers' intended publication of the information was
somewhat commercial in that they were undeniably in the business
of disseminating information. In short, Seattle Times was an un-
sympathetic case from the standpoint of vacating the protective
order.
Unfortunately, Seattle Times did not completely remove the First
Amendment confusion about protective orders. The decision has
been interpreted in conflicting ways by the federal courts. In Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc.," the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
interpreted Seattle Times as leaving "no room for lower courts to
consider first amendment factors in fashioning or reviewing Rule
26(c) orders." 92 The Cipollone court said that the Supreme Court's
opinion was "consistent with the position that the first amendment
is simply irrelevant to protective orders in civil discovery," the re-
sult being that protective orders are not subject to a "less restrictive
means test.19 3
However, in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc."" the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit disputed the Cipollone court's inter-
pretation, concluding instead that the Seattle Times Court ruled
simply that protective orders implicated First Amendment rights
"to a far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemination of
information in a different context." 5 The Anderson court ruled that
87. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 34.
88. Id. at 25.
89. Id. at 27 (quoting Record at 63, Seattle Times, (No. 82-1721)).
90. Id. at 25.
91. 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987).
92. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1119.
93. Id.
94. 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
95. Id. at 7 (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 34) (emphasis
added). See H.S. Gere & Sons, Inc. v. Frey, 509 N.E.2d 271. 274 (Mass. 1987) (quot-




"first amendment considerations cannot be ignored" in protective
orders, but "scrutiny must be made within the framework of Rule
26(c)'s requirement of good cause.""6 While the First Circuit found
that Seattle Times "foreclosed any claim of an absolute public right
of access to discovery materials," it said that Seattle Times "did not
hold that a discovery protective order could never offend the first
amendment."9 The Anderson court's observation that First Amend-
ment interests were implicated to a "far lesser extent" is consistent
with Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co.,98 an earlier case in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit remanded to the lower court for a redetermination of good
cause in light of Seattle Times. The Tavoulareas court said Seattle
Times "does not require a court to apply especially close scrutiny in
deciding whether to give parties to a civil litigation, including news-
papers, a right to disseminate information gained through the dis-
covery process." 9 That Seattle Times qualified, instead of repudi-
ated, a role for the First Amendment in the consideration of a Rule
26(c) order is also evident from the Court's analytical approach. The
Court invoked the test of Procunier v. Martinez,'0 ° which asks
whether "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no
greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the partic-
ular governmental interest involved."101 To quote the Anderson
court, the Seattle Times Court applied "the heightened scrutiny
test of Procunier to the practice of restraining a litigant's right to
disseminate discovery information, not to any particular application
of Rule 26(c)."10 Having resolved the constitutional validity of the
Rule, the Seattle Times Court then observed that the trial court
must have broad discretion "to weigh fairly the competing needs
and interests of parties" and "substantial latitude to fashion the
protective orders" 103 without engaging in "heightened First Amend-
96. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d at 7.
97. Id. at 6-7. Indeed, the First Circuit subsequently struck down two protective
orders on First Amendment grounds as "too vague and too broad" in In re Perry, 859
F.2d 1043, 1050 (1st Cir. 1988). The Perry court said the protective orders, issued by
an administrative law judge, were an attempt to regulate the content of union cam-
paign literature. Id. at 1049.
98. 737 F.2d 1170, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (remanding an order to the lower court
for a redetermination of good cause in light of Seattle Times v. Rhinehart).
99. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 737 F.2d at 1172.
100. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
101. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 32 (quoting Procunier v. Marti-
nez, 416 U.S. at 413).
102. 805 F.2d at 7 n.2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
interpreted Seattle Times a third way in The Courier Journal v. Marshall, 828 F.2d
361 (6th Cir. 1987). In a decision denying a writ of mandamus to a newspaper seeking
public access to discovery information, the Courier Journal court indicated that the
Procunier test should be applied to the specific protective order request. Id. at 364.
103. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36.
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ment scrutiny of each request.""1 " The Court thereupon deferred to
the Washington Supreme Court, which held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion.' 0 The Court noted that it was "apparent
that substantial government interests were implicated" given the
movants' rights of privacy and religious association at stake.'
In summary, Seattle Times found Washington Rule 26(c) consti-
tutionally valid. In its application, a limited First Amendment scru-
tiny is incorporated within the trial court's examination of good
cause. If good cause is shown to warrant a limitation on a party's
First Amendment rights, the court has broad latitude to fashion an
order restricting dissemination of information as far as necessary to
avoid injury to the party at risk.1 0 7 Absent a showing of good cause,
the parties or witnesses receiving the discovery information retain a
First Amendment right to disseminate the information.' 8
A protective order granted without the requisite showing of good
cause, in addition to encroaching on the First Amendment rights of
parties or witnesses, would also exceed the court's authority under
Rule 26(c).10 9 By the logic of Rule 26(c) itself, the trial court's broad
discretion in this area, recognized by the Seattle Times Court, is not
an unlimited discretion. Similarly, although Maine Rule 26(c) in-
cludes an admonition to apply the Rule with liberality to protect the
parties and witnesses, the Rule nevertheless requires that a good
cause threshold be met.110
To fathom this limitation requires looking only as far as Gulf Oil
Co. v. Bernard,"' a 1981 class action in which the Supreme Court
affirmed the vacating of a Rule 23 order barring counsel from com-
municating with potential class members. The issue in Gulf Oil was
whether the lower court had abused its discretion by falling to en-
gage in a "careful weighing of competing factors. '""2 The Gulf Oil
104. Id. at 36 n.23.
105. Id. at 36.
106. Id. at 37 n.24.
107. This approach may not be as strict as that taken in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which the Court said that an incidental restriction on speech
must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the government's] inter-
est." Id. at 377.
108. Concurring with the majority in a separate opinion. Justice Brennan. joined
by Justice Marshall, viewed the Court's holding as recognizing a First Amendment
consideration in formulating protective orders. "The Court today recognizes that pre-
trial protective orders . . . are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment,"
Brennan wrote. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 37 (Brennan. J., concurring).
109. "There can be no doubt that Seattle Times left that prerequisite (good
cause] to a protective order wholly intact." Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co.. 737
F.2d 1170, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 892 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); ME. R. Civ P 26(c).
111. 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
112. Id. at 102.
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Court, referring to the "good cause" analysis of Rule 26(c) for com-
parison,"' said that the trial court had abused its discretion by not
appropriately identifying and balancing "the potential abuses"
against "the rights of the parties under the circumstances.",14 The
Court said that although the trial court had "both the duty and the
broad authority" to enter orders governing the conduct of counsel
and parties in class action cases so as to manage the case, "this dis-
cretion is not unlimited, and indeed is bounded by the relevant pro-
visions of the Federal Rules."'1 5 Interestingly, the Gulf Oil Court
did not believe itself compelled to resolve which First Amendment
standards were implicated in the decision to issue the order"0 but
observed only that the order involved "serious restraints on expres-
sion."' 17 The significance of the Court's balancing approach is that
absent a proper determination of good cause any First Amendment
interest may be sufficient to make the trial court's order an abuse of
discretion.
Courts therefore must make a determination of good cause be-
cause they are required to do so by Rule 26(c), and they must con-
sider First Amendment interests. Since First Amendment considera-
tions are merged into the "good cause" determination of Rule 26(c),
the limitations that Rule 26(c) allows on the First Amendment
rights of parties or witnesses can be delineated only by examining
''good cause." Yet ascertaining a "good cause" threshold that applies
across cases is problematic because a determination of good cause is
necessarily fact-specific. That alone is justification for granting trial
courts broad-but not unlimited-discretion in this area.
III. GOOD CAUSE
Good cause is a legal term of art. One federal court has described
good cause as meaning that "a sound basis or legitimate need" 8
exists to justify its order. The Seattle Times Court did not provide a
definition. Nonetheless, determining good cause for a protective or-
der should involve the court in a deliberate, logical analysis.
The movant for the order has the burden of production and per-
suasion."0 The movant first must identify and articulate for the
court the harm that might result from dissemination. Maine and
Federal Rule 26(c) define the harms from which parties or witnesses
113. Id. at 102 n.16.
114. Id. at 102-03.
115. Id. at 100.
116. Id. at 103-04.
117. Id. at 104.
118. In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987).
119. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986);




should be protected to include "annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense." Courts have construed Federal
Rule 26(c)(7) and its predecessor, Rule 30(b), to protect "a wide va-
riety of business information" 2 ' so long as the likelihood of harm is
shown. The Seattle Times Court noted that "[a]lthough the Rule
contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or inter-
ests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad
purpose and language of the Rule." 2 ' Consistent with this approach,
courts have recognized competitive disadvantage as a basis for a
Rule 26(c) order, although they have not designated the specific
type of harm in Rule 26(c) under which it would be categorized.1 22
The movant must show that the harm would be significant,' and
has a reasonable likelihood of occurring. 24 The movant's assertions
must be substantiated "by specific examples or articulated reason-
ing"125 as opposed to "stereotyped or conclusory statements.
1 20
To determine if good cause has been shown, the court must bal-
ance the harm to the movants if the discovery information is dis-
seminated (as well as the court's corresponding interest in managing
the discovery process12" ) against the countervailing interests subor-
120. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.. 529 F. Supp. 866, 890
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (construing FED. R Civ P 26(c)(7)).
121. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 35 n.21.
122. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. at
890 (construing FED R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7)).
123. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1121.
124. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (Ist Cir. 1986); In re San Juan
Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 117 (1st Cir. 1981). For a pre-Seattle Times summation of the
two approaches toward the probability of harm, viz., "reasonable likelihood" and "se-
rious and imminent threat," see In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 193 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
In light of the Seattle Times decision, reasonable likelihood would seem to be the
proper standard.
125. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d at 1121 (citing United States v.
Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)); General Dynamics Corp. v. Seib
Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973). cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974); 8
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 2035. See also Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard. 452 U.S.
89, 102 n.16 (1981) (citing In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1979), for the
standard of showing required for good cause); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc.. 805 F.2d at
7.
126. United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978); General
Dynamics Corp. v. Seib Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1162 (1974); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18. § 2035.
127. The court has an interest in overseeing the discovery process to prevent its
abuse. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 35. "Abuse" has been said by
Harvard law professor Arthur Miller to include "all forms of activity, whatever the
motivation, that represent a use of the system that does not serve a legitimate discov-
ery function." Miller, supra note 16, at 446 n.93. Abuse in the present context might
be to use the discovery process to obtain information irrelevant to the litigation in
order to threaten the opposing party with embarrassment or to maliciously harm the
opposing party. See also infra note 155 and accompanying text. In other contexts,
abuse includes the use of discovery to delay the litigation process, or to frustrate or to
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dinated by a protective order. These countervailing interests may
include the limited First Amendment interests of parties or wit-
nesses recognized in Seattle Times,'28 the general interest of the
courts in "just, speedy and inexpensive" determinations of actions'2 9
that might be assisted by the sharing of information with other
plaintiffs in similar litigation,' and the interests of third parties.' 3'
The balancing test is essential to determine whether good cause ex-
ists, despite the fact that under the Seattle Times standard the
First Amendment interests of parties and witnesses will fall victim,
at least in some degree, to a reasonable likelihood of substantial
harm. This weighing of the interests is the sine qua non of the justi-
fication for the trial court's broad discretion.'3 2
Seattle Times itself illustrates the kind of showing that may be
required of the movant. The Washington trial court first denied
(without prejudice) Rhinehart and his religious organization a Rule
26(c) protective order restricting dissemination of the list of donors,
which the court was requiring Rhinehart and the organization to
provide the Seattle Times in discovery. Filing a motion for reconsid-
eration, Rhinehart and his organization submitted affidavits of sev-
eral members detailing letters and telephone calls defaming the or-
ganization and in some cases threatening physical injury to
members. Actual attacks were also described. The affidavits asserted
that public disclosure of donor lists would affect membership and
donations and would result in harassment and reprisals.'3 3 The trial
court thereupon entered a protective order restricting dissemination.
In Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.13 4 a fed-
eral district court refused to issue a protective order because the
movant failed to satisfy a similar standard. The defendant insurance
company had moved for a protective order to restrict dissemination
of its claim files, underwriting files, engineering files, and claim and
underwriting manuals on the ground that disclosure to competitors
would reduce Aetna's competitive advantage.' 35 Aetna did not sup-
port its assertions with affidavits providing a factual basis but relied
only upon conclusory arguments.'3 In refusing to enter a protective
order, the Nestle Foods court characterized Aetna's submission as
impose burdensome expenses on the opposing party. HARE, supra note 9, § 5.6.
128. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
130. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 211-13 & 222-27 and accompanying text.
132. "The trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs
and interests of parties affected by discovery." Seattle Times v. Rhinebart, 467 U.S.
at 36 (footnote omitted).
133. Id. at 25-27.
134. 129 F.R.D. 483 (D.N.J. 1990).
135. Id. at 485 n.5.
136. Id. at 485.
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"only general and vague references to harm' 3 7 and "broad and con-
clusory allegations.
1 38
What constitutes a sufficient showing in practical terms is not eas-
ily definable. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co.,139 an antitrust case involving massive amounts of docu-
ments, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania qualified its discussion of the requisite showing for a
protective order by observing that "[f]requently the injury that
would flow from disclosure is patent, either from consideration of
the documents alone or against the court's understanding of the
background facts. The court's common sense is a helpful guide."1
40
In denying Aetna a protective order, the Nestle Foods court also
relied on its "common sense" to conclude that a real fear of compet-
itive harm would have dissuaded Aetna from having cooperated pre-
viously with other insurers in sharing information of the type at
issue. 4'
The characterization of the information can be significant. The
type of information for which courts are asked to restrict dissemina-
tion varies greatly and may include, for example, internal memo-
randa, marketing research, design specifications, minutes of safety
committees, and records of other claims by injured people or of con-
sumer complaints.
The movant for a protective order may try to characterize the ma-
terial as trade secrets, a category which is explicitly included in Rule
26(c)(7) for protection by a court order. This characterization, if
convincing, can persuade a court that good cause exists for a protec-
tive order, particularly since legislation has afforded protection to
trade secrets. For example, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, as
adopted by Maine, instructs courts to guard trade secrets during
litigation.'42
However, the definition of a trade secret is ambiguous and may be
overly elastic.' 3 Maine's Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade
secret as information that "[d]erives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to and not being
readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can ob-
tain economic value from its disclosure or use" and concerning
which the owner has made "reasonable" efforts "to maintain its se-
137. Id.
138. Id. at 486.
139. 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
140. Id. at 891.
141. Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 129 F.R.D. 483. 484 tD.N.J.
1990).
142. ME_ REV STAT ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1541-1548 (West Supp. 1991-1992).
143. See Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Conlidentiality Controversy, 1991 U
ILL L REV 457, 490.
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crecy. 1"'4 In addition, the magnitude of the harm from dissemina-
tion may vary greatly even among the types of information that may
be characterized as trade secrets.
14 5
Some courts, consequently, have applied standards to determine
whether information is a true trade secret worthy of protection from
dissemination. These standards include (1) the extent to which the
information already is known by outsiders, (2) the extent to which
the information is known by employees and others in the business,
(3) the measures taken by the movant to guard the information's
secrecy, (4) the value of the information to the movant and its com-
petitors, (5) the amount spent by the movant in developing the in-
formation, and (6) the ease with which others could properly acquire
or duplicate the information. 146
Information need not qualify as a trade secret in order to be pro-
tected by the courts from dissemination. Rule 26(c)(7) makes clear
that disclosure of "other confidential research, development, or com-
mercial information" may be restricted. Sensitive commercial infor-
mation may not qualify as a trade secret but may nevertheless cause
injury to the movant if disseminated. Information on relationships
among licensees, customers, and suppliers could fall into this cate-
gory, for example, if some of them were to make unfavorable com-
parisons of their negotiated terms with others' terms.147
Rule 26(c) also empowers a court to enter an order restricting the
dissemination of confidential information that may only embarrass a
party or person. The Seattle Times Court observed that the power
to enter a protective order to protect from "annoyance, embarrass-
ment, [and] oppression" implicitly recognizes the value of protecting
privacy in the discovery process. 148 Protecting privacy thus can be
144. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1542 (West Supp. 1991-1992).
145. See generally Marcus, supra note 143, at 488-93. Marcus notes that the ex-
treme of a "true trade secret" is the formula for Coca-Cola, which only two people in
the Coca-Cola Co. were said to know. The two people were forbidden to fly on the
same plane, and the formula was kept in an Atlanta bank vault that could be opened
only upon resolution of the company's board of directors. Id. at 489 & n.183 (citing
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288 (D. Del. 1985)).
146. See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40,
46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Farnum v. G.D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d 384, 389 (Iowa
1983). See also Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Propriety and Extent of State
Court Protective Order Restricting Party's Right to Disclose Discovered Information
to Others Engaged in Similar Litigation, 83 A.LR 4TH 987, 991 (1991). For example,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided in Smith v. BIC
Corp., 869 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1989), that design information that appeared in a patent
or that could be obtained by reverse engineering did not qualify as a trade secret,
whereas specifications and tolerances that could not be so discerned were trade
secrets. The result in Smith was reached without explicitly using these criteria. Id. at
199-201.
147. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp.
866, 880-81 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
148. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 35 n.21.
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distinguished from protecting a trade secret or the direct commer-
cial value of information. 9 The Court noted that "[a]lthough the
Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or
interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the
broad purpose and language of the Rule." '
However, courts have shown a reluctance to recognize the non-
monetary privacy interests of a business partly on the rationale that
embarrassment can be so easily and commonly claimed. Conse-
quently, a business applicant for a protective order "whose chief
concern is embarrassment must demonstrate that the embarrass-
ment will be particularly serious."15 ' Furthermore, "[a]s embarrass-
ment is usually thought of as a nonmonetizable harm to individuals,
it may be especially difficult for a business enterprise, whose pri-
mary measure of well-being is presumably monetizable, to argue for
a protective order on this ground.' 5 2 Seattle Times, in contrast, in-
volved a religious group-rather than a business group-and its
leader in litigation with a newspaper.
Consistent with Cipollone, the Third Circuit in Smith v. BIC
Corp.'53 held that BIC Corp.'s claim that publicly disclosing other
accidents from its product would embarrass the company, creating
bad publicity that would push its stock price down, did not consti-
tute good cause to limit dissemination of that particular informa-
tion.' 4 The court was explicit that a showing of direct economic
harm from the release of confidential information would have been
more influential than a showing of harm from bad publicity.'15
After the proffering of facts by the movant, the court must bal-
ance the assertions of harm against countervailing interests, an in-
herently fuzzy proposition given that incompatible rights and inter-
ests must be weighed. Nevertheless, as cases following Seattle Times
demonstrate, the countervailing limited First Amendment interest
should outweigh (a) conclusory assertions of harm, (b) assertions of
149. See Marcus, supra note 143, at 491-92.
150. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 35 n.21.
151. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986).
152. Id.
153. 869 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1989).
154. Id. at 201.
155. Id. The motivation of the party intending to disseminate discovered informa-
tion could be relevant if it contributes to the movant's showing of a reasonable likeli-
hood of serious or substantial harm or if it constitutes an abuse of the court's
processes. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 35. For example, a showing
that a party obtained confidential information irrelevant to the litigation for the pur-
pose of profiting from its sale presumably would constitute such an abuse. Conse-
quently, the Rule 26(c) power to restrict speech means that a trial court may become
entangled in determining the party's motivation for exercising its limited First
Amendment right. Courts must ensure, however, that a naked allegation of the liti-
gant's motivations not excuse the movant for a protective order from making a partic-
ularized showing of a reasonable likelihood of serious or substantial harm.
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confidentiality or trade secret status when disclosure already has
been made elsewhere, and (c) harms that extend only to corporate
embarrassment or bad publicity.
It is only the particular showing of a reasonable likelihood of seri-
ous or substantial harm that meets the threshold of good cause for a
protective order limiting dissemination. Even when that threshold is
crossed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has said that the court fully retains its discretion whether to issue a
protective order. 5 ' Even when good cause is shown, the court that
decides to enter a protective order has the responsibility to fashion
the order to account for the interests of the opposing parties, of wit-
nesses, and of third parties.
IV. FASHIONING THE PROTECTIVE ORDER
Upon the particular demonstration of fact, the court has the dis-
cretion to issue an order to protect the parties or witnesses while
weighing the interests of the other litigants or of third parties. Rule
26(c) vests authority in the court to make the determination of good
cause, to decide after balancing the interests whether to issue the
protective order, and to fashion the order as the court deems neces-
sary to protect the interests shown.
In this context, Federal and Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d),
governing the use of injunctions, provide a useful analogy to Rule
26(c) in that they involve a similarly remedial, as opposed to puni-
tive, power of the court.157 Both versions of Rule 65(d) require that
the restraining order or injunction state the reasons for the order
and be specific in its terms. By analogy to Rule 65(d), the court
should state reasons for the issuance of the Rule 26(c) protective
order and be specific within the order so it may be easily obeyed and
enforceable and not be oppressive.""8
156. "Even when good cause for the issuance of a protective order is shown, the
decision to grant such an order lies in the discretion of the court." In re Agent Or.
ange Product Liability Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 559, 572 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff d, 821
F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987).
157. FED R. Civ, P. 65(d) reads:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set
forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in
reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document,
the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties
to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and
upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive
actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
ME. R Civ P 65(d) is substantially the same.
158. 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 2955, at 540-43. An example of lack of
specificity in a protective order occurred in Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d
834 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987), an action brought by United
Steelworkers of America members alleging violations of the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act. (This action was one of three brought on the issue by United
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The court faces three principal issues in fashioning such a protec-
tive order. It must resolve to whom the order applies, to what infor-
mation the order applies, and to whom the information may be
given. The easiest issue is to whom the order applies. The issue is
only theoretical and not problematic since the nature of secrecy de-
mands that it apply, first, to the parties' counsel initially receiving
the information in the discovery process, and second, to anyone else
authorized by the order to receive the information from the coun-
sel.159 Typically, potential or actual witnesses are required to ac-
knowledge the terms of the protective order or sign an agreement to
comply, for purposes of application of the order, before they may
receive the information. '
A. To What Information Does the Order Apply?
In deciding which information should be restricted from dissemi-
nation, the court is not entirely bound by the good cause showing of
the movants. Although one might suppose that the information sub-
ject to the restriction must be exactly that information which the
court explicitly determines would cause the injury if disseminated,
in complex litigation courts frequently issue blanket protective or-
ders, commonly called umbrella orders.""1 Such orders restrict dis-
Steelworkers members.) The court entered a protective order prohibiting dissemina-
tion of "documents." Plaintiffs' counsel and Continental Can's counsel interpreted
the order differently. Continental Can argued unsuccessfully that "documents" in-
cluded depositions taken during discovery. Telephone Interview with Daniel McIn-
tyre, plaintiffs' counsel (Apr. 21, 1992).
159. See HARE, supra note 9, at 42 & n.6. See, e.g., Baker v. Liggett Group. Inc.,
132 F.R.D. 123, 127-28 (D. Mass. 1990) (allowing disclosure to counsel; to partners,
associates, secretaries, paralegal assistants and employees to the extent required for
services; to persons with prior knowledge of the documents or information; to parties
or their representatives assisting counsel; to court officials; and, upon signing of a
confidentiality agreement and submission of it to opposing counsel, to outside consul-
tants or witnesses); Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., No. 90-0245 P (D. Me. Jan. 17,
1992) (protective order) (allowing disclosure to counsel; to expert witnesses after pro-
vision of a resume to opposing counsel and execution by the witness of an acknowl-
edgment of the protective order's terms; and to any prospective or actual witness
after execution of an acknowledgment).
160. See HARE, supra note 9, § 4.3; see also Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., No. 90-
0245 P at 3-4 (D. Me. Jan. 17, 1992) (protective order); Baker v. Liggett Group, Inc..
132 F.R.D. 123, 127-28 (D. Mass. 1990).
161. See HARE, supra note 9, § 4.10. See also In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litiga-
tion, 820 F.2d 352 (l1th Cir. 1987):
Busy courts are simply unable to hold hearings every time someone wants
to obtain judicial review concerning the nature of a particular document.
The order issued in this case, as in others, is designed to encourage and
simplify the exchanging of large numbers of documents, volumes of records
and extensive files without concern of improper disclosure.
Id. at 356. See also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108. 1123 (3d Cir.




semination of any information gathered in discovery upon a designa-
tion of confidentiality of that information by the movant for the
order. Typically, the application of the protective order to any par-
ticular article of discovery is lifted only after successful application
by the affected party to the court.'6 2
Such umbrella orders are theoretically problematic given that Se-
attle Times recognizes a limited First Amendment right incorpo-
rated in the good cause determination. It is difficult to justify a
court order restricting an individual's First Amendment right to dis-
close any particular fact on the basis that there is good reason to gag
that person concerning other, but as yet unspecified, facts.16 3 Two
principles overcome this difficulty.
First, the language of Seattle Times indicates that the court issu-
ing a protective order need not be overly concerned about over-
breadth of its order. The Seattle Times Court explicitly gave the
trial courts "substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.'' 0
The Court in fact rejected the "least restrictive means" test em-
ployed by the First Circuit in In re San Juan Star Co., 65 a case
preceding Seattle Times.
Second, the simple practicalities of litigation in massive cases de-
mand that courts not engage in a document-by-document approach
to fashioning such protective orders. The Manual for Complex Liti-
gation, Second, developed to assist the judiciary in the management
of complex cases,' 6 endorses the use of umbrella orders, for exam-
ple.'6 7 Clearly, it was the potentially enormous consumption of judi-
cial resources that pushed the Seattle Times Court toward rejecting
a "least restrictive means" test. As the Seattle Times Court noted,
"heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for a protec-
tive order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and
could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals ....
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,'6 9 an
international antitrust case lasting nearly a decade, is a legendary
162. HARE, supra note 9, § 4.10. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d at
1122.
163. From an absolutist first amendment position . . . it is difficult to see
how umbrella orders could pass muster because, at the time the order is
presented to the court, the identity of the documents to be designated con-
fidential is not known. Seattle Times rejected that absolutist view, how-
ever, and left it for lower courts to make good cause determinations in issu-
ing protective orders.
Marcus, supra note 143, at 500.
164. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36.
165. 662 F.2d 108, 116 (lst Cir. 1981).
166. See Miller, supra note 16, at 449.
167. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND, § 21.431, at 53 (1985).
168. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36 n.23.
169. 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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example1 7 1 of the implications of massive litigation for management
of discovery in the context of protective orders. The Zenith Radio
court was asked to decide the confidentiality status of 3,500 docket
filings, 17,000 pages with cross-references to 250,000 documents in
plaintiffs' final pretrial statement, and millions of documents pro-
duced in discovery and marked confidential.'7 1 The court denied a
motion to remove a pre-trial umbrella protective order that would
have meant a wholesale post-trial declassification of the confidential
status of documents produced in discovery.'
72
Two other related considerations influence the courts' tendencies
to use umbrella protective orders. One is the goal of speedy adminis-
tration of justice,1 73 and the other is the interest of the litigants,
including the parties whose speech is restricted, to move the discov-
ery smoothly along as an aid to resolving the real issues being
litigated.' 74
Given the legitimacy accorded umbrella orders, once a trial court
has found good cause to enter a protective order restricting dissemi-
nation, the protective order is not invalid even if it is somewhat
overbroad. To the consternation of strict First Amendment adher-
ents, the good cause test must be viewed conceptually as more of a
threshold for entering the protective order than an exacting deter-
mination of what information can be restricted from
dissemination. 175
In this context, the admonition in Maine Rule 26(c) for the court
to exercise its powers- over discovery, including the power to enter
protective orders, "with liberality toward the accomplishment of its
[the Rule's] purpose to protect parties and witnesses" appears more
meaningful. Given that Seattle Times evidently legitimizes the
power to enter an umbrella order restricting all discovered informa-
tion designated by the movant as confidential, a Maine court genu-
170. Indeed, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. was cited by the
Seattle Times Court as an example of what the Court hoped to avoid by its recogni-
tion of broad discretion in the trial court. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at
36 n.23.
171. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.. 529 F. Supp. at 873.
172. Id. at 915.
173. FED. R. Civ. P. 1; ME. R, Civ. P 1. Both Rules include the sentence: "They
[these Rules] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action."
174. See HARE, supra note 9, § 2.4, at 14: "Expense and delay are more that Isicl
a mere residue of the litigation. If left unabated, they threaten the ability of the
system to deliver justice in as real a sense as artificial limitations on discovery would
do."
175. See Nestle Foods Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 129 F.R-D. 483. 486
(D.N.J. 1990) ("While this Court recognizes that umbrella-type protective orders,
such as submitted by defendants here, are valid, nonetheless, the movant still is re-




inely can take the admonition to heart.
However, regardless of the legitimacy of entering umbrella protec-
tive orders, the reality is that such orders often prejudice the judi-
cial mechanics against the party whose speech is restricted. By al-
lowing the movant for the protective order to designate the
documents which shall be confidential, courts delegate a power that
only in the rarest circumstances they would grant in other areas of
the litigation process. Giving the movant such power to determine
which information shall not be disseminated naturally invites over-
designation and potentially lowers the good cause test governing any
particular item to a standard of whether such a classification can be
argued with any justification. 17
Another possible impact is more subtle. In umbrella orders, the
court's review typically is enlisted only if the affected parties object
to the designation. Recognizing that the court used the umbrella or-
der precisely to avoid protracted disputes on the designation of con-
fidentiality, the affected parties understandably may be reluctant to
risk aggravating the court by contesting the movant's branding of
discovery. 17 7 When the affected party overcomes its reluctance, its
request for the court's intervention puts it in a position of seeking a
change in the status quo, potentially creating a disguised shift in the
burden of persuasion from the original movant for the order to the
affected party.17
8
Finally, protective orders are rarely appealed by parties and are
still more rarely overturned because of their status as interlocutory
orders, the desire of litigants to address the central litigation, and
the strong disposition of reviewing courts to give the trial court
broad latitude in fashioning the orders. 7 Therefore, umbrella or-
176. The tendency of counsel to overdesignate discovery information as confiden-
tial is widely recognized.
The problems of preserving protection for documents produced under
confidentiality orders are aggravated by the understandable tendency of
counsel to err on the side of caution by designating any possibly sensitive
documents as confidential under the order. . . . Although the judge, in the
interest of reducing the time and expense of the discovery process, should
be somewhat tolerant of this practice, counsel should not mark documents
as protected under the order unless they are at least arguably subject to
protection. The designation of a document as confidential may be viewed as
equivalent to a motion for protective order and subject to the sanctions of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION. SECOND, § 21.431, at 53 n.60 (1985).
177. HARE, supra note 9, § 4.10, at 56.
178. Id. § 1.1, at 2.
179. See id. § 6.15, at 158 (interlocutory orders are not normally appealable); Su-
san M. Angelo, Note, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders and the First Amendment, 80
COLUM L. REV. 1645, 1659 n.91 (1980) (appellate courts are reluctant to overturn a
decision granting or denying a protective order); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467
U.S. at 36 (stating that "[t]he trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the
competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery").
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ders frequently can significantly exceed the scope of justifiable re-
striction on a party's First Amendment interests and yet persist.'80
Courts can, however, take steps to lessen (although not eliminate)
these problems. To minimize the potential for abusing the confiden-
tiality designation of information by the movant, the court can ex-
pend enough judicial resources to limit the order to particular cate-
gories of discovery by subject and age of the information. 8 ' In
addition, the court might explicitly put the movant on notice in its
order that the movant will bear the burden of establishing the ap-
propriateness of its designation of discovery information as confi-
dential if the issue reaches the court.18 2 Finally, any shifting in bur-
den can be minimized or eliminated by providing that the party
whose speech is restricted inform the movant of the basis for an ob-
jection to the confidentiality designation of particular information
and by providing, if the parties do not resolve the dispute, that the
movant retain the burden of establishing appropriateness.
A 1992 amendment to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which is
designated Rule 26(g), adds the step of requiring the opposing par-
ties to meet "in a good faith effort to resolve by agreement" any
disputes about a motion for a protective order.8 3 The Rule requires
the movant for the order to certify "that such a conference has
180. Cf. HARE, supra note 9, § 4.10, at 56.
181. HARE, supra note 9, § 4.11.
182. In Baker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 123 (D. Mass. 1990), a case in-
volving a cigarette manufacturer's liability, the court issued an umbrella order with
the following provision:
If plaintiffs seek to establish that certain documents or information (or
categories of documents or information) designated as confidential, previ-
ously or in the future, are not entitled to such status and protection, they
shall inform counsel for Liggett and Reynolds [the movants of the order] of
the basis for their objection. Within twenty days thereafter, if the parties
cannot resolve the dispute, Liggett or Reynolds shall, pursuant to the Local
Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
bring the matter to the Court for resolution, and bear the burden of estab-
lishing that a protective order concerning such documents or information is
appropriate.
Id. at 127.
183. ME. . Civ. P. 26(g) reads:
Discovery Motions: Conference Required. Before filing a motion
for a physical examination pursuant to Rule 35, a motion to determine suf-
ficiency of answers or objections to requests for admission pursuant to Rule
36(a), a motion to compel discovery pursuant to Rule 37(a)(2), or a motion
for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c), counsel for the moving party
shall confer with counsel for the opposing party in a good faith effort to
resolve by agreement the issues in dispute. Any such motion when filed
shall be accompanied by the certificate of the moving party, subject to the
provisions of Rule 11, that such a conference has taken place, or that speci-
fied reasonable efforts have been made to hold such a conference, and that
counsel have been unable to resolve the dispute.
Rule 26(g) became effective on Feb. 15, 1992. 599 A.2d CV.
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taken place, or that specified reasonable efforts have been made to
hold such a conference, and that counsel have been unable to resolve
the dispute.' 18 4 The Rule, prompted by the frustration felt by
judges in resolving time-consuming discovery disputes' and
adapted from Local Rule 16(e) of the United States District Court
for the District of Maine, 8 ' could exert pressure on all sides not to
overreach and could stem overuse of protective orders. Clarifying
the Rule's scope to require litigants to make a good faith effort to
resolve challenges to confidential designations after an umbrella pro-
tective order is entered could also be worthwhile.
B. To Whom May the Information Be Given?
The third issue the court must address in fashioning a protective
order is to whom disclosure of information is prohibited. The least
restrictive order might be to prohibit dissemination to competitors
of the movant. A more restrictive order would prohibit dissemina-
tion to competitors and the media, and the most restrictive order
would prohibit dissemination by counsel to all entities and individu-
als except to co-counsel and support staff. 1
7
Witnesses needing to be informed of discovered information for
the litigation, typically experts, are usually permitted to receive the
information provided that they acknowledge the terms of the order
and agree to abide by its terms. However, protective orders often
condition dissemination to witnesses on providing notice to the mo-
vant and, in some orders, providing the witness's resume.188 This
condition can offer a strategic advantage to opposing parties because
they can discern early an opposing party's potential expert
184. Id.
185. Telephone Interview with Peter Mills, member and former chairman of the
Discovery Subcommittee, Maine Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure
(Mar. 17, 1992). The Advisory Committee explained that the amendment's "purpose
is to reduce the number of contested discovery motions . ME. R. Civ. P 26(g)
advisory committee's note (forthcoming).
186. ME. R. Civ, P. 26(g) advisory committee's note. An amendment to Federal
Rule 26(c) requiring a good faith meeting similar to that of the current District of
Maine Local Rule has been proposed. The proposed language would add the require-
ment that a movant for a protective order accompany with the motion "a certificate
that the movant in good faith has conferred or attempted to confer with other af-
fected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action." COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (Aug. 1991).
187. HARE, supra note 9, § 4.2. According to Hare, the least restrictive order is
common in cases in which a competitor is a party. Id.
188. See, e.g., Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., No. 90-0245 P (D. Me. Jan. 17, 1992)
(protective order); Bailey & Bailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Emerson Elec. Co.,




A more practical problem with protective orders surfaces in the
ability of expert witnesses to comply with such orders. Expert wit-
nesses bound by protective orders have the problematic duty to
mentally separate and ignore confidential information they learn in
one case when supporting their expert opinion in another case.' 0
A still more difficult problem is the potential incidental disclosure
of information by lawyers to witnesses when the lawyers are counsel
in similar litigation. For example, Continental Can Co. alleged in
Gavalik v. Continental Can Co.'"' that a plaintiffs' lawyer was in
contempt of a protective order by using confidential, discovered
materials from that case to draft a complaint in another case.'0 2
Judge Alan N. Bloch of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, noting the difficulty that the law-
yer preparing a complaint or taking a deposition would have in dis-
tinguishing between information known from sources covered by a
protective order and information known through other sources,
found no contempt. Judge Bloch instead criticized his own protec-
tive order as overreaching when it threatened to become a justifica-
tion "to search the minds of lawyers to see where they got the infor-
mation to file a complaint somewhere else or to do something
somewhere else."' 93
189. See HARE, supra note 9, § 4.8, at 53 (asserting that identifying potential ex-
pert witnesses exceeds the scope of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), thus insulating the iden-
tity of consulting experts from discovery); id. § 4.9. at 55-56 (maintaining that at-
tempts to modify an order reveal strategy to the opposing party).
190. Id. § 4.16.
191. 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denled, 484 U.S. 979 (1987).
192. Transcript of Hearing at 1, Gavalik (Nos. 81-1519, 82-1995) (W.D. Penn.
Sept. 13, 1989).
193. Id. at 130. Judge Bloch's more extensive comments were:
These people who have testified today have indicated that certainly they
looked at documents, they read depositions. It appears to me certainly
some of those, if not all of them, came before the protective order or came
from other sources than the Gavalik case discovery.
As any attorney does in preparing a complaint or in taking a depossition.
naturally you make yourself familiar as you can with the facts of the situa-
tion. You don't necessarily think about where you got knowledge of those
facts.
And that's why I said a few minutes ago I'm going to be much more re-
strictive in the use of this type of protective order in the future, and I mean
that-
The purpose of my protective order was not to eliminate other suits in
other jurisdictions. That was never the case. You came to me, as many law.
yers do in many cases, and said, "These people in their discovery are seek-
ing very confidential information," and I said, and I have said, as I say, in
most situations like that, "Well, there's a way we can protect that. We can
see to it that they only use this confidential information as they might need
it to prosecute this particular case." I didn't mean in that to limit other
cases anywhere else. I meant to satisfy you about your worry about confi-
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A group often excluded from receiving confidential information is
other lawyers involved in similar litigation. This exclusion probably
generates the greatest discomfort and disadvantage for the parties in
the litigation who are restricted by the order. Plaintiffs' counsel in
product liability actions involving the same or similar products are
typically prevented by such protective orders from discussing the
strategic significance of discovered information or interpreting for
others the meaning of discovered information."" In addition, coun-
sel in similar litigation are handicapped in their effort to determine
that their discovery request was comprehensive and cannot ensure
that their opponent has responded completely, consistently,' and
candidly' to discovery requests. Particularly in product liability ac-
tions-cases that are often technically demanding-the counsel for
the defendant company frequently collaborate in preparing their de-
fenses to similar claims whereas the plaintiffs' counsel can be barred
from meaningful collaboration.' 9"
These factors might not outweigh a significant public interest or
some other good cause against sharing of discovery information
should such public interest or good cause be shown. However, no
meaningful public interest is served in most cases by restricting the
sharing of confidential information among litigants in similar
dential information.
This case has taught me something, and I've never had a problem-I've
issued a lot of these orders in the past, and I've never had a problem like
this before, but this case has taught me a lesson, and I'm going to be a lot
more restrictive in issuing those kind of orders and I'm going to say to par-
ties who come in with that argument, "That's too bad. You give them the
discovery, because the discovery is relevant, and we're not going to give you
a protective order."
Because we're not going to get involved in situations like this, where
we're trying to search the minds of lawyers to see where they got the infor-
mation to file a complaint somewhere else or to do something somewhere
else. The Courts have enough problems and enough work without getting
into those kinds of situations.
And so you will have to suffer the consequences of confidential informa-
tion getting out because you are involved in a lawsuit, and that's part of
what you have to put up with when you have a judicial system such as ours
in this country, which provides for the discovery of relevant materials.
Id. at 129-30.
194. HARE, supra note 9, § 4.15.
195. Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987).
196. Problems with candor in discovery have been noted in complicated
litigation. See, e.g., id. (citing Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1341
(5th Cir. 1978); Seaboldt v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 290 F.2d 296, 299 (3d
Cir. 1961); Gammon v. Clark Equip. Co., 686 P.2d 1102, 1107 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1984), aff'd 707 P.2d 685 (Wash. 1985); Buehler v. Whalen, 374 N.E.2d
460. 467 (Il. 1977); Rock Island Bank & Trust Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 220
N.W.2d 799, 801 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974); and Bollard v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 569, 583 n.4 (W.D. Mo. 1971)).
197. Marcus, supra note 143, at 495. Cf. HARE, supra note 9, § 2.5, at 17.
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cases, 198 and many courts have ruled that the risk of sharing discov-
ery information does not constitute by itself good cause for a protec-
tive order prohibiting dissemination. " 9 Moreover, adherence to the
Seattle Times decision does not require a restriction on the sharing
of information among litigants. 00
Indeed, the sharing of discovery among litigants in different cases
may serve the public interest. It may foster speed and minimize dis-
covery costs in litigation, both of which fall within the goals of pro-
cedure embodied in both Maine and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
1. One federal district court denying a protective order observed
that such sharing even reduced the cost of the discovery process to
the party from whom the discovery was obtained, namely, the mo-
vant for the order. 01 Arthur Miller of Harvard University suggests
that the "central inquiry" of a court analyzing the issue of sharing
discovery with other litigants should be whether the sharing "will
actually promote litigation efficiency and fairness."210 However,
Miller may be contemplating this inquiry in the context of a motion
to modify a protective order, not in the fashioning of the original
order. Fashioning the original order with adequate notice provisions
similar to those governing the dissemination of information to wit-
nesses would better accommodate the restricted litigant and con-
serve judicial resources without creating an injustice to the party
from wliom discovery was obtained.
The Manual for Complex Litigation, Second recommends sharing
such discovery material,2 0 3 concluding that "substantial savings in
time and expense may often be achieved. '20 ' The Manual even
raises the possibility that counsel in some cases "may be required to
seek access to such materials before undertaking new discovery" be-
cause Federal Rule 26(b)(1)(i) empowers the court to limit discovery
when the information is obtainable from a "more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive" source.215 When a protective order in
another case limits such disclosure, the Manual suggests that the
judges in the two cases consult toward accommodating a
198. See Marcus, supra note 143, at 496.
199. See Wauchop v. Domino's Pizza. Inc., 138 F.R.D. 539. 546 (N.D.
Ind. 1991).
200. See Marcus, supra note 143, at 495.
201. Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982).
202. Miller, supra note 16, at 497.
203. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION. SECOND, § 21.431, at 53 and n.61
(1985).
204. Id. § 21.431, at 53.
205. Id. The exact text of FED. R CIv P 26(b)(1)(i) reads:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in sub-
division (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the dis-
covery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable





A potential concern for the court in the sharing of discovery is the
party who wants to profit commercially from the sale of the discov-
ered information to other litigants. Miller suggests that a court
should be "particularly hesitant" about commercialization of discov-
ered information, but he acknowledges that the recovery by the
party of its cost of obtaining the discovered information may be ap-
propriate through such sale of the information.207 So long as the po-
tential sale of the discovered information is not the purpose for en-
gaging in the discovery, the court's concern about commercialization
does not invalidate the legitimacy of "sharing" discovery expenses.
Resolution of these two issues may lie in a court's allowing a party a
"controlled recovery" of some discovery costs.2""
V. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN DISCOVERED INFORMATION
The issue of public access to information during pretrial discovery
is not as difficult as the issue of a right of a party or counsel in the
litigation to disseminate it. In Seattle Times the Court said that the
public's interest in discovered information is not a constitutional or
a common law restriction on the court's power to enter a pretrial
protective order.209 As the Court noted, "[P]retrial depositions and
interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. ...
[R]estraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information
are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of
information."21
Clearly, under Seattle Times, the public does not have a pretrial
right of access to most types of information during discovery. How-
ever, the hypothetical situation in which particular information pro-
duced in discovery could be "so significant to the process of self-
governance" that the court would violate the First Amendment if it
imposed secrecy has not been discarded by commentators.2 ' The
potential remains that some right of public access to narrow types of
discovery material might be recognized, but that hypothetical re-
mains untested.
Frequently, litigants agree to confidentiality of discovered infor-
mation and settlement amounts in pretrial settlement agreements.
206. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION. SECOND, § 21.432, at 53-54.
207. Miller, supra note 16, at 497-98 & n.342.
208. Marcus, supra note 143, at 499.
209. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 33.
210. Id. (citations omitted). The First Circuit noted the Seattle Times finding in
Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988), in which it said:
"Certainly the public has no right to demand access to discovery materials which are
solely in the hands of private party litigants." Id. at 780.
211. Anne E. Cohen, Note, Access to Pretrial Documents Under the First
Amendment, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 1813, 1833 (1984). Cohen's hypothetical was recently
recognized by Arthur Miller as conceivable. Miller, supra note 16, at 441.
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Considering the absence of a recognized public right of access to
such information, the confidentiality provided by settlement agree-
ments between private parties usually does not invoke constitutional
or common law claims.2"2 However, greater concerns about the pub-
lic interest arise in cases in which the parties involve governmental
entities or individuals, in which the agreement is by a court-ap-
proved class settlement, or in which the court held trial-like pro-
ceedings to promote or design the settlement. '
The widespread use of protective orders when issues of significant
interest to the public are involved-and a general lack of success in
contesting protective orders-has recently prompted legislation or
rule changes in Virginia, Florida, and Texas..2 " To the chagrin of
corporate counsel, plaintiffs' lawyers, with the support of the media,
have campaigned in these states against practices involving secrecy
in the management of discovery materials.2 1 5 Their successes are a
product of public concern about the judicial system's protection of
parties' commercial interests at the expense of public health and
safety and of a general predilection against secrecy in governmental
functions, irrespective of their judicial context.21 6
Virginia has restricted the use of protective orders that prevent
the sharing of information among litigants in similar actions. Protec-
tive orders preventing dissemination of discovery information in
personal injury actions or actions for wrongful death cannot prohibit
an attorney from "sharing such material or information with an at-
torney involved in a similar or related matter. . . ." Notice and an
opportunity for a hearing must be given to affected parties, and the
receiving attorney must agree in writing to be bound by the protec-
tive order.217
Florida has imposed broader limitations on protective orders. The
Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act prohibits courts from restricting
212. See Marcus, supra note 143, at 502-05; see also Miller, supra note 16. at 484-
87.
213. See Marcus, supra note 143, at 505 n.285; see also Miller, supra note 16, at
486-87.
214. Nicholas Wittner and Richard Campbell, Protective Orders Under Attack.
Asi. CORP. COUNS. 15 (Winter 1990).
215. Miller, supra note 16, at 442-45. See, e.g.. ATLA Challenges Secrecy Order
for Defective Heart Valves, ATLA ADVOC., May 1990. at 1; SocIErY OF PROFESSIONAL
JOURNALISTS AND ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, KEEPING SECRETS JUS-
TICE ON TRIAL 9, 15-16 (1990).
216. See ATLA Challenges Secrecy Order for Defective Heart Valves, ATLA AD-
voc., May 1990, at 1; Nicholas Wittner and Richard Campbell, Protective Orders
Under Attack, Aht. CORP. COUNS. 15 (Winter 1990). For a critical discussion of the
movement to restrict the use of protective orders, see Miller, supra note 16, at 441-45.
217. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (Michie Supp. 1990). For a short discussion of
the Virginia law, see Alan Morrison, Protective Orders, Plaintiffs, Defendants and




disclosure of information or materials "concerning a public hazard"
or "useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from
injury which may result from the public hazard . . . ." In addition,
the Act gives standing to "any substantially affected person, includ-
ing but not limited to representatives of the news media" to contest
an order or agreement restricting dissemination.2 "
Texas moved in the same direction by changing its Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Supreme Court of Texas amended its rules to recog-
nize a presumption of public access to court records-defined in the
rules to include unfiled discovery materials and settlement agree-
ments-"concerning matters that have a probable adverse effect
upon the general public health or safety ... ."I" Rule 76a also re-
quires a showing of "a specific, serious and substantial inter-
est"-outweighing the public interest-to seal such court records
and, significantly, a finding that there is "no less restrictive means"
to protect the private interest.2 20 The Rule gives third parties the
right to intervene in determining the confidentiality of records. 22 1
A number of courts have recognized a common law right of public
access to records filed with the court,222 but in Anderson v. Cryovac,
Inc. 223 the First Circuit declined to extend that right to discovery
information filed with the court.2 4 This interpretation is compatible
with the Supreme Court's view in Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions, Inc.225 The Supreme Court in Nixon acknowledged "a general
right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including
judicial records and documents, '22 but the Court noted that the
right was not absolute and could be subordinated to other concerns
at the discretion of the trial court.227
However, a statutory presumption of public access to discovered
information filed with the court has been discerned under the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 5(d) requires the filing of all pa-
pers after the complaint but allows the court on its own motion not
to require filing. 228 The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 5(d)
218. FLA STAT. ANN. § 69.081(6) (West Supp. 1991).
219. TEX R Civ. P. 76a(2)(c).
220. TEX. R. Civ, P 76a(1).
221. TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(4).
222. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & nn.7 & 8 (1978),
provides a summary of courts that have recognized this common law right.
223. 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
224. Id. at 13.
225. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
226. Id. at 597.
227. Id. at 598-99.
228. FED. R Civ. P. 5(d) reads:
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be
filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time there-
after, but the court may on motion of a party or on its own initiative order
that depositions upon oral examination and interrogatories, requests for
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observe that the Committee "first proposed that discovery materials
not be filed unless on order of the court or for use in the proceed-
ings. But such materials are sometimes of interest to those who may
have no access to them except by a requirement of filing, such as
members of a class, litigants similarly situated, or the public gener-
ally."22 In In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation30 the
Second Circuit interpreted Rule 5(d), paired with Rule 26(c), to
"provide a statutory right of access" by class action litigants and the
general public to discovery materials filed with the court. In Hawley
v. Hall23' the United States District Court for the District of Nevada
similarly interpreted Rule 5(d) to allow a presumption of public ac-
cess to pretrial documents filed with the court unless a protective
order is issued. The Hawley court consequently adopted a policy of
requiring the filing of discovery documents on request of a non-
party in the absence of a protective order restricting access.23
Rule 5(d) is not, however, a good indicator of federal district
courts' operations. Many district courts have adopted local rules dis-
pensing with the filing requirements except when needed in connec-
tion with motions.2 33 Even when filing is made, the court can seal
the records234 at its discretion, which is a lesser standard than the
good cause standard for restricting the right to dissemination.23
The policy of filing discovery unless otherwise ordered and the
Notes explaining that policy in Federal Rule 5(d) are absent from
the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. Maine Rule 5(d) refers to Rule
26(f), which says that discovery "shall not be filed with the court"
unless "otherwise ordered. 23 8 Maine Rules 5(d) and 26(0, taken to-
gether, do not suggest a statutory presumption of public access to
pretrial discovery that is filed. However, those rare instances in
which discovery is filed in Maine may coincide with some use of the
discovered information in a court proceeding or as the basis for a
ruling, possibly creating a right of public access.
documents, requests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not
be filed unless on order of the court or for use in the proceeding.
229. FED. R. Civ P. 5, advisory committee's note, 1980 Amendment, Subdivision
(d).
230. 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1987).
231. 131 F.R.D. 578 (D. Nev. 1990).
232. Id. at 583.
233. See Marcus, supra note 20, at 13-14 & nn.61-62 (1983).
234. See id.; Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 33 n.19; Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). aIf'g United States v. Mitchell, 551
F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
235. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 598.
236. The text of ME. R Civ P. 26(f)(1) begins: "Unless otherwise ordered by the
court, or necessary for use in the proceeding, notices, written questions and tran-
scripts of depositions, interrogatories, requests pursuant to Rules 34 and 36, and an-
swers, objections and responses thereto shall be served upon other parties but shall
not be filed with the court."
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The use of discovered information as the basis for a court decision
or in a court proceeding, other than a ruling on a discovery mo-
tion23 7 creates a common law presumption of public access. For in-
stance, in Joy v. North23 8 the Second Circuit characterized a docu-
ment produced through discovery which was submitted to support a
motion for summary judgment as "no longer a private docu-
ment. . . . [but] part of a court record. Since it is the basis for the
adjudication, only the most compelling reasons can justify the total
foreclosure of public and professional scrutiny. 2 39 The Seventh Cir-
cuit reached the same conclusion in In re Continental Illinois Se-
curities Litigation.2
40
Whether the presumption of public access to civil trials rises to a
First Amendment right has not been decided by the Supreme Court.
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court"1 the Supreme Court
recognized a constitutional right of public access to criminal pro-
ceedings that can be denied only on a showing of a compelling gov-
ernment interest and by narrowly tailoring the denial to serve that
interest.242 Several circuits have relied upon many of the same rea-
sons cited by the Court in Globe Newspaper to discern a right of
public access, perhaps even a First Amendment right, to civil tri-
als243 --insuring quality, honesty, and respect for the legal system,
and adhering to a tradition of public access.24 Consequently, federal
appeals courts have imposed a Globe-like test on requests to limit
the public's access to discovered information admitted into evi-
dence.241 Public access to a trial should be understood to include the
right to inspect and copy the judicial record, including the tran-
237. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1987). The First Circuit
said that discovered information submitted to the court for a ruling on a discovery
motion does not create a right of public access. The court was explicit that "there is
no right of public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions" because
of a traditional lack of openness of the discovery process to the public and a "funda-
mental" difference between proceedings on discovery motions and other "proceedings
to which the courts have recognized a public right of access." Id.
238. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
239. Id. at 894.
240. 732 F.2d at 1302, 1312-13 (7th Cir. 1984).
241. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
242. Id. at 606-07.
243. See In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984);
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir. 1983).
244. See supra note 243.
245. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071, 1073 (3d Cir. 1984); In
re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1313 (7th Cir. 1984); Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983); In re San Juan Star
Co., 662 F.2d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 1981). See also Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.,
580 F. Supp. 913, 916-17 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1983), aff'd, 724 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1984)




script, as well as the ability to attend open court proceedings.2 4 0
Admission of discovered information as evidence, absent an at-
tempt to condition admission on confidentiality, has been construed
to constitute a publication of the information and a waiver of confi-
dentiality interests preserved by a pretrial protective order unless
the pre-trial order specifically applies.2 4 7 A party wishing to preserve
the confidentiality of discovered information, therefore, should move
to condition any use or admission of confidential information on its
being sealed. Should the court be unwilling to seal those parts of the
record, the party might attempt to preserve the confidentiality of
the documents themselves-even those going to a jury-without
sealing the information actually read into the record in a hearing or
trial.
248
The standard to deny public access is a higher one than good
cause for a pretrial protective order 4 9 and, therefore, should require
an analysis distinct from that required to enter the pretrial order.25 0
A major justification for pretrial protective orders, the litigant's abil-
ity in discovery to obtain information from a party that will not be
made public in a trial, 51 is lacking in the consideration of orders
limiting public access to information that has been submitted as evi-
dence. A trade secret still should qualify under this post-trial test
for protection from dissemination.2 52 However, a mere private inter-
est in secrecy may be overcome if that "secret" has been published
in an open court,253 although that fact may not be conclusive. Infor-
mation that merely causes a corporation embarrassment or bad pub-
lic relations, both of which have been held to be insufficient justifi-
cation for a pretrial protective order, clearly should not warrant a
246. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673. 678 (3d Cir. 1988).
247. Id. at 680; National Polymer Prods. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 421
(6th Cir. 1981). The Third Circuit acknowledged a common law and First Amend-
ment right of public access to civil trials in Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d
1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984).
248. See, e.g., In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press. 773 F.2d 1325.
1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
249. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
250. The court in Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 580 F. Supp. 913 (N.D.
Iowa 1983), evidently engaged in such a re-analysis. Id at 916 n.4.
251. National Polymer Prods. v. Borg-Warner Corp.. 641 F.2d at 424.
252. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d at 1071. Maine Rule of Evidence
507 grants a privilege for a witness or party possessing a trade secret and instructs
the court to take "protective measures" to preserve that privilege when disclosure to
the court is required. ME. R EvID 507.
253. "A serious question exists as to whether sealing transcripts of proceedings
held in open court or exhibits displayed in open court is ever justifiable.. . . It suf-
fices to note that once an exhibit is publicly displayed, the interest in subsequently
denying access to it necessarily will be diminished." United States v. Mitchell, 551
F.2d 1252, 1260-61 (D.C. Cir. 1976), affd sub. nom. Nixon v. Warner Communica-





VI. THE POST-TRIAL RIGHTS OF PARTICIPANTS
Following the admission of discovered information in evidence in
open court, the First Amendment right of litigants and witnesses to
disseminate the information usually remains subject to the pretrial
protective order. Yet, by publication in open court, the judiciary has
lost some degree of control over the information. Reimposing control
over the published information raises a "specter of government cen-
sorship" that the Supreme Court did not find in Seattle Times be-
cause of uninterrupted judicial control over the discovered informa-
tion in that case.254 After publication in open court, imposing a prior
restraint on the speech of the participants in the litigation restricts
their First Amendment right to disseminate beyond that of non-par-
ticipants. However, as officers of the court, counsel may be con-
strained to comply with a pretrial protective order that requires the
return of all copies of discovered information.2 55 Other participants
in the litigation, such as expert witnesses, seemingly also would be
bound by an order to which they had agreed as a condition of receiv-
ing the information.
The Third Circuit case of Littlejohn v. BIC Corp.258 supports an
interpretation that the court's continued restriction on information
published at trial imposes a greater burden on the First Amendment
interest of the participants than does restriction on dissemination of
pretrial information. In Littlejohn the plaintiff's counsel was held
not in contempt of a pretrial protective order for retaining and dis-
seminating discovered information after its publication in trial de-
spite the order's terms that the information be returned to the de-
fendant company without dissemination." "If the public had a
right of access to the deposition testimony and exhibits admitted
into evidence, then [the attorney] did no more than exercise this
right in retaining copies of these documents." 58 The Third Circuit,
although concerned about the counsel's violation as an officer of the
court, noted that the protective order did not explicitly apply to
deposition testimony read into the record and exhibits admitted
into evidence.259 The tone of the Littlejohn court, however, suggests
254. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 32.
255. See Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d at 684 ("As an officer of the court,
[Attorney] Kardos bound himself to conscientiously adhere to these terms [of the
protective order].").
256. 851 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1988).
257. Id. at 686.
258. Id. at 684.
259. Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d at 686 (distinguishing the protective order
at issue from that in Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 580 F. Supp. 913 (N.D.




that an attorney would be unwise to act on his First Amendment
right in the face of a standing pretrial protective order, irrespective
of publication in open court.260 Prudence demands a motion to mod-
ify the protective order.
The post-trial restriction also has a great potential to be misap-
plied to information obtained independently of the proceeding
rather than solely applied to information obtained through the pro-
ceeding. In Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc.,261 a product liability suit
involving a chipper/shredder, 26 2 the United States District Court for
the District of Maine entered an umbrella protective order restrict-
ing dissemination of material designated as confidential by the de-
fendant company and requiring the destruction of the documents
within 90 days after the completion of the litigation. 2 3 The order,
currently on appeal to the First Circuit, was granted on the basis
that the information involved "trade secrets and other confidential
information. '2 3 Included in the confidential designation were the
identities of people who had claimed injuries from chipper/shred-
ders. As a result, the plaintiffs' depositions of people who had
claimed injuries were included within the documents to be destroyed
after the trial.265 The district court denied a request to modify the
order and instead ordered that Garden Way's counsel could remove
all discovery documentation in the court's file, and the court further
sealed "all testimony and arguments made during the trial" dealing
with material subject to the protective order.2"6
260. "Scrupulous compliance with court discovery orders is particularly important
because our system of discovery relies on the cooperation and integrity of attorneys
operating within the guidelines provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the provisions of any protective order." Id. at 684.
261. Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., No. 90-0245 P (D. Me. Jan. 17. 1992) (protec-
tive order).
262. The Super Tomahawk chipper/shredder allegedly caused an injury requiring
amputation of Mr. Poliquin's hand. Poliquin alleged improper design and failure to
warn. Mem. of Att'y Maurice Libner in Supp. of Mot. for Relief from Protective Or-
der, Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc. (D. Me. Feb. 18, 1992) (No. 90-0245 P).
263. Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., No. 90-0245 P (D. Me. Jan. 17, 1992) (protec-
tive order). The order identified some categories of documents specifically, but also
allowed the defendant to designate future documents as confidential. Id. at 2.
264. Id. at 1. Garden Way, Inc., the defendant company which manufactured the
chipper/shreddei alleged to have injured the plaintiffs, argued that dissemination of
the information "could well be detrimental to its competitive edge" and that "'It]here
does not appear to be any legitimate purpose for permitting this information t) be
used elsewhere outside the context of this litigation." Mem. of Law in Supp. of .Mot.
for Protective Order, Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc. (D. Me. May 17, 1991) (No. s.
0245 P). A supporting affidavit from a Garden Way vice president was filed with the
court but was confidential. Letter from Maurice A. Libner, plaintiffs attorney I Mar
18, 1992) (on file with the author).
265. Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Determination of Confidentiality. Poliquin v.
Garden Way, Inc. (D. Me. Nov. 25, 1991) (No. 90-0245 P).
266. Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., No. 90-0245 P (D. Me. Jan. 17, 1992) (protec-
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In Seattle Times the Supreme Court explicitly based its holding
on the fact that the protective order was placed on information not
obtained from sources "independent of the court's processes. 2 6 7 By
contrast, the information in the Poliquin depositions was obtained
by the plaintiffs' counsel from sources other than the company and
without compulsion by the court. A parallel exists with the case of
Butterworth v. Smith,268 in which the Supreme Court prohibited
Florida from silencing a grand jury witness who wanted to publish
his testimony. The Court emphasized that the information was in
his possession before he testified before the grand jury.26 9 Similarly,
in International Products Corp. v. Koons270 the Second Circuit
modified a protective order to allow a party to disseminate informa-
tion he possessed before giving a deposition covered by the protec-
tive order. In instances in which the counsel for Poliquin knew, prior
to discovery, the identities of the other persons claiming similar in-
juries, the depositions of those individuals clearly should have been
outside the protective order. Neither Butterworth nor Koons is di-
rectly on point, however, with regard to those instances in which
information in the depositions was the product of learning the iden-
tities of the third parties through discovery.
The more attenuated the relationship between the confidential in-
formation obtained from the defendant and the information devel-
oped independently by the restricted litigant, the greater the First
Amendment interest that may be involved. Under these circum-
stances, the justifications for recognizing only a limited First
Amendment interest may be diminished. First, the information at
issue may not be proprietary and confidential to the defendant. Sec-
ond, the protective order approaches a classic prior restraint if it
restricts dissemination of information obtained less through the
court process than "through means independent of the court pro-
cess."' 71 The question raised by Poliquin is whether gaining the
identification of information sources through compelled discov-
ery-the identification having been designated confiden-
tial-necessarily makes all subsequent information obtained through
those sources equally confidential. Even if the answer is yes, practi-
cality and efficiency should demand that litigants in similar litiga-
tion not be required to incur the expense and effort of redeveloping
the identical information.
The result of the Poliquin order is that the third parties deposed
in that litigation can expect requests to give basically the same dep-
tive order).
267. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 34.
268. 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
269. Id. at 635.
270. 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
271. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 33-34.
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osition to each future plaintiff in similar litigation on the company's
chipper/shredders. Indeed, counsel for Poliquin reported that the
taking of the depositions was costly to the plaintiff and that many of
the people deposed gave their depositions reluctantly and with con-
siderable personal difficulty. 2
Significantly, the counsel for Poliquin became plaintiff's co-coun-
sel in a very similar claim in New York State,273 but the district
court denied his motion for relief from the protective order.27' Shar-
ing of discovered information would avoid the expense and delay to
the plaintiffs-and to some extent the defendant company-of re-
peating discovery. Imposing confidentiality puts the plaintiffs attor-
ney in the bizarre position of knowing information that he cannot
share or even discuss with co-counsel.2 78 Imposing a repetition of
costs and difficulties on future litigants and the third parties is con-
trary to the admonition of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 to con-
strue the rules to promote the "just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action."
VII. CONCLUSION
The constitutional legitimacy of wide-ranging Rule 26(c) orders to
protect against dissemination of trade secrets and other commer-
cially valuable information of parties is beyond dispute after Seattle
Times. However, the pressure on overtaxed judicial resources, the
admonition in Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) to protect par-
ties and witnesses from harm from the discovery process, and a ten-
dency to enter umbrella orders create a very real potential for
overuse of the court's authority. This potential should be taken seri-
272. Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Determination of Confidentiality. Poliquin v.
Garden Way, Inc. (D. Me. Nov. 25, 1991) (No. 90-0245 P).
273. Mem. of Att'y Maurice Libner in Supp. of Mot. for Relief from Protective
Order, Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc. (D. Me. Feb. 18, 1992) (No. 90-0245 P).
274. Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., No. 90-0245 P (D. Me. Mar. 17, 1992) (order
denying motion for relief from protective order).
275. Daniel McIntyre, counsel for members of the United Steelworkers of America
in three suits against Continental Can Co., experienced a similar problem during liti-
gation. The cases against Continental Can alleged that the company violated the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act by laying off employees before they qualified
for pensions. McIntyre obtained highly significant documents through discovery in
Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984). Because of a protective
order issued by the federal court, McIntyre could not share the documents with his
co-counsel in Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987). cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987), a case involving the same issues. The documents provided
substantial support for the plaintiffs' claim that the company was trying to control
pension costs through layoffs and plant closing, according to McIntyre. His co-counsel
eventually obtained the documents because they were filed with and released by the
Los Angeles federal court's clerk as not sealed. Telephone Interview with Daniel Mc-
Intyre, plaintiff's counsel (Apr. 21, 1992). The third of the three actions against Con-
tinental Can Co. was McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171 (3d Cir. 1990).
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ously, given that trial courts have been granted broad latitude to
issue such orders and there is little likelihood of appellate review.
Although the limited First Amendment interests of parties and
witnesses in this regard are difficult to measure against the commer-
cial and privacy values of litigants, the criteria for issuing protective
orders exist to require a balancing of interests. In particular, consci-
entiousness requires a specific showing of a reasonable likelihood of
injury from dissemination and a determination not to allow con-
clusory statements to suffice. Once an adequate showing of good
cause is made, the protective order can be fashioned to take into
consideration the disadvantages of limitations on sharing of discov-
ered information among other litigants in similar actions and the
unconscious burden shifting that may occur in the fashioning of um-
brella protective orders.
Therefore, the following issues should be considered in determin-
ing whether to grant a protective order:
(1) What categories of information are being claimed as confiden-
tial, and are they equally confidential?
(2) Has the movant supported its claims with particularized show-
ings of a reasonable likelihood of serious or substantial injury?
(3) Has the information already been disclosed to others; has the
movant made efforts to maintain the confidentiality of the informa-
tion; and could the information be developed independently at little
expense?
(4) Is there an alternative and less restrictive means to prevent
the claimed harm?
(5) What are the interests of the parties opposing the protective
order, the interests of the court system, and the interests of the pub-
lic, and can they be accommodated by the fashioning of the protec-
tive order?
(6) Is the magnitude of the discovery so broad that the court may
manage the issue of confidentiality only by an umbrella order?
(7) If an umbrella order is warranted, has the burden been main-
tained on the movant to justify future designations of
confidentiality?
(8) Will the protective order restrict dissemination of the informa-
tion itself, restrict comment on the information, or restrict even dis-
closure of the fact that such information exists?
(9) To whom will dissemination be prohibited: competitors, the
public, other litigants, the client?
(10) What requirements will be imposed on witnesses before they
may receive information?
(11) Is the protective order specific, so that it may be easily
obeyed?
Finally, a constitutional right of public access to judicial proceed-
ings requires that courts engage in a separate, heightened First
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Amendment analysis before sealing court records from the public.""0
To overuse protective orders is to ignore valid public interests and
spark attempts to limit by statute the authority of the courts to pre-
serve confidentiality interests.
Thomas C. Bradley
276. See supra text accompanying notes 241-51.
19921

